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Data Privacy and the Financial Services Industry: A 
Federal Approach to Consumer Protection 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Industry leaders are no longer asking if a comprehensive federal 
data privacy law should be implemented; instead the question has shifted 
to how it should be implemented.1  In response to a growing number of 
data breaches2 and the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation3 (“GDPR”), states are adopting their own data privacy 
legislation.  These state changes have led to a patchwork of state laws that 
U.S. companies are struggling to satisfy.4  To unify the patchwork of data 
privacy laws across the U.S., lawmakers have introduced numerous 
federal privacy proposals over the past year.5  Committees in both the 
House and Senate have sought feedback from stakeholders to evaluate 
 
 1. The technology industry as well as CEOs of financial services companies are calling 
on Congress to pass a federal privacy bill.  See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, Business Roundtable CEOs 
Call on Congress to Pass Comprehensive Nationwide Consumer Data Privacy Law, (Sept. 
10, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-ceos-call-on-congress-
to-pass-comprehensive-nationwide-consumer-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/4VMM-
BFW8] (explaining industry stakeholders’ support of a federal privacy legislation); David 
Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data Privacy, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/MM3L-XKAA] 
(discussing businesses’ support of federal data privacy legislation because of the confusing 
patchwork of privacy laws currently in place). 
 2. See Zachary N. Layne, Note, The Modern Threat: Data Breaches, Security Measures, 
and a Call for Changes, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 159, 160–62 (2019) (discussing recent data 
breaches experienced by many industries). 
 3. The European Union (“EU”) effectuated comprehensive privacy legislation, the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), in May 2018.  EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L119). 
 4. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti et al., State Law Developments in Consumer Privacy, 
JACKSON LEWIS (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2019/03/articles/consumer-privacy/state-law-
developments-in-consumer-privacy/ [ https://perma.cc/P8M2-7QQJ] (explaining changes in 
state data privacy laws); see also Elizabeth Feld, Note, United States Data Privacy Law: The 
Domino Effect After the GDPR, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. Part V (2020) (discussing the effects 
of the GDPR on financial institutions’ privacy compliance efforts). 
 5. See Lazzarotti, supra note 4 (discussing data privacy legislative proposals at the state 
level). 
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legislative solutions,6 while the Federal Trade Commission7 (“FTC”) has 
held hearings to help shape the legislative debate.8 
Although banks are currently subject to the privacy provisions of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 19999 (“GLBA”), banks often gather 
consumer information that is not protected by the GLBA; this is the type 
of consumer data that should be protected by a comprehensive federal 
privacy law.10  Such comprehensive federal privacy legislation should 
preempt state privacy laws to avoid inefficiencies associated with the 
industry’s compliance with a patchwork of state laws.11  However, a 
federal data privacy law that preempts state laws should have strong data 
protections to maintain consumer trust.12  While the GLBA has helped 
 
 6. See Neil Haggerty, Top Senators Seek Input on How to Strengthen Data Privacy, AM. 
BANKER (Feb. 13, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/top-senators-
seek-input-on-how-to-strengthen-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/45MB-FG5D] (discussing 
lawmakers’ efforts to pass federal privacy legislation). 
 7. The FTC and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) are two federal 
agencies that jointly enforce the consumer privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 (“GLBA”), a federal law that provides protections to consumers of financial 
institutions. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (2018).  The 
FTC enforces the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule (“Privacy Rule”) of the 
GLBA, which applies to non-bank financial institutions, 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 (2018), and the 
CFPB enforces the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Regulation (“Regulation P”) 
of the GLBA, which applies to banking financial institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 1016.1 (2018).  Both 
privacy regulations have similar requirements.  Id.; 16 C.F.R. § 313.1. 
 8. The FTC held informational hearings on data security and privacy issues in December 
2018 and in April 2019.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Hearing 12: The FTC’s Approach to 
Consumer Privacy (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-
hearing-competition-consumer-protection-21st-century-february-2019 
[https://perma.cc/2RV4-4X7K]. 
 9. The GLBA only applies to “nonpublic personal information.” 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). 
 10. Julie Bernard, Consumer Data Privacy: Why We Need a Single (Federal) Law, 
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2019/03/29/consumer-data-privacy-why-
we-need-a-single-federal-law/#1bd94e43623f [https://perma.cc/27C4-JE3C] (advocating for 
federal legislation that protects personal data). 
 11. See Joe Rubin, Banks Must Brace for Renewed Privacy Fight, AM. BANKER (Dec. 20, 
2018, 10:01 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-must-brace-for-renewed-
privacy-fight [https://perma.cc/RA9B-MUMT] (addressing the difficulty of adding 
preemption to federal data privacy legislation). 
 12. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Notice of 
Request for Public Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 187, 48600 (proposed Sept. 26, 2018) (“Trust is 
at the core of the United States’ privacy policy formation.”).  Public concern of privacy and 
security on the Internet could hinder the growth of the digital economy.  NAT’L TELECOMM. 
& INFO. ADMIN, Most Americans Continue to Have Privacy and Security Concerns, NTIA 
Survey Finds, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.: BLOG (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2018/most-americans-continue-have-privacy-and-security-
concerns-ntia-survey-finds [https://perma.cc/UD7J-QGYC] (“[P]rivacy concerns may lead to 
lower levels of economic productivity as people decline to make financial transactions on the 
Internet. . . . [A]t least a third of online households have been deterred from certain forms of 
online activity, such as financial transactions, due to privacy and security concerns.”). 
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consumers trust banks with their data,13 it is unclear how long consumers 
will trust financial institutions if consumers continue to fall victim to data 
breaches and lose confidence in banks’ information sharing practices.14   
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II discusses the case for 
preemption of the current patchwork of state data privacy laws and the 
role of the GLBA in a federal privacy framework.15  Part III analyzes the 
scope of federal privacy legislation through the definition of personal data 
and its effect on financial institutions.16  Part IV explores the user control 
rights that federal privacy law should require banks to provide 
consumers.17  Part V evaluates how a comprehensive federal data privacy 
law can impose external accountability on financial institutions through 
various enforcement efforts.18  Part VI concludes this Note.19 
II.  PREEMPTION OF STATE DATA PRIVACY LAWS AND AMENDING THE 
GLBA 
 Preemption is a divisive and high-stakes issue because it impacts 
all aspects of existing and future privacy law.20  There are two ways to 
 
 13. See Voters Are Clear: Banks Are Trusted with Personal Data, BANK POL’Y INST., 
https://bpi.com/dataprivacy/ [https://perma.cc/B95S-VTV7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) 
(describing survey results showing that consumer voters were “[three times] more likely to 
trust banks and financial institutions to collect and protect their personal data than they are 
technology companies”); see also A.T. KEARNEY, Key Findings from the Consumer Digital 
Behavior Study (Apr. 2018), https://www.atkearney.com/financial-services/the-consumer-
data-privacy-marketplace/the-consumer-digital-behavior-study [https://perma.cc/8RAC-
4KNQ] (“Consumers view banks as their best agent in protecting consumer data privacy and 
security.”). 
 14. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (“NTIA”) conducted a national survey in 2017 that found consumer concerns 
related to Internet transactions included “identity theft, credit card or banking fraud, data 
collection by online services, loss of control over personal information, data collection by 
government, and threats to personal safety.”  NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note 
12.  While data breach notification is an important issue in the data privacy and security 
debate, this Note does not address data breach requirements in the context of future federal 
data privacy law.  Id. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See infra Part VI. 
 20. See Abbie Gruwell, Preemption Takes Center Stage Amid Federal Data Privacy 
Action, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2019/04/08/preemption-takes-center-stage-amid-federal-data-
privacy-action.aspx [https://perma.cc/5P7P-48PG] (discussing the significance of preemption 
in the privacy debate). 
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approach federal preemption of existing privacy laws.21  A federal data 
privacy law can preempt state data privacy laws by establishing a 
ceiling22 or serving as a federal baseline that allows for stricter state 
laws.23  For example, the GLBA has an anti-preemption provision that 
sets a federal statutory floor, allowing states to pass more stringent state 
laws.24  Additionally, a federal data privacy law can affect existing 
federal sectoral data privacy laws, such as the GLBA, by exempting 
entities covered by existing sectoral laws from compliance with the new 
federal law.25  Conversely, a new federal law could require covered 
entities to comply with the new federal law in addition to the existing 
sectoral privacy law, and where the laws conflict, the covered entities 
would have to follow the stricter law.26  Since stakeholders seek 
uniformity in their privacy compliance efforts, lawmakers should resolve 
the question of preemption of state laws and conflicting federal laws so 
that stakeholders effectively understand their privacy obligations.27 
A. Preemption of State Data Privacy Laws 
The concept of preemption has often baffled legislators because 
it is a “more intricate and highly contested provision” of lawmakers’ 
legislative proposals.28  Consequently, few legislative proposals for a 
comprehensive federal privacy law include provisions that preempt state 
 
 21. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption & Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 946 (2009) 
(explaining the possible approaches to federal preemption in context of privacy law). 
 22. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) establishes a federal ceiling that 
preempts all state and local laws. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1–19 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
151–169 (2018); see also Schwartz, supra note 21, at 928 (discussing the NLRA’s legislative 
challenges because of its preemption provisions). 
 23. See Schwartz, supra note 21 (discussing the different ways lawmakers can design 
preemption provisions of federal laws); see also Danielle K. Citron, The Privacy 
Policymaking of Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 801–03 (2016) (explaining 
preemption of state law and the role of state attorneys general (“AG”) in privacy enforcement 
generally). The GLBA is an example of a federal law that establishes a minimum level of 
legal protections and requirements and allows for states to impose more stringent laws. 
Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6807 (2018). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 6807. 
 25. See Citron, supra note 23 (explaining preemption of state law and the role of state 
attorneys general in privacy enforcement). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Gruwell, supra note 20 (discussing the significance of preemption in the privacy 
debate). 
 28. Caitlin Chin & Marla Odell, Highlights: Where Stakeholders Fall in the Privacy 
Debate, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK BLOG (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/09/17/highlights-where-stakeholders-fall-in-
the-privacy-debate/ [https://perma.cc/6ZDL-AW7K]. 
2020] FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION 531 
data privacy laws,29 as states have taken varying approaches to consumer 
protection by adopting a patchwork of legislation.30  
The California Consumer Privacy Act31 (“CCPA”) is currently 
the most protective comprehensive state data privacy law in the country.32  
As of October 2019, sixteen other states have introduced comprehensive 
state privacy bills to enhance consumer data protections of their 
residents.33  Many state data privacy bills give consumers a private right 
of action.34  Other state laws provide for consumers’ rights to access 
personal information collected and shared with third-parties, to deletion 
of their data, to data portability, and to opt out of the sale of personal 
information.35  Additionally, as of October 2019, twelve state privacy 
laws, including the CCPA, require covered entities to provide privacy 
notices.36  The CCPA and ten other state laws prohibit discrimination 
against consumers who exercise their privacy rights.37  Several state data 
 
 29. Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act (“Data Control Act”), H.R. 
2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Balancing the Rights of Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act 
of 2019 (“Web Surfers Act”), S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019); see John Hendel & Cristiano 
Lima, Lawmakers Wrangle over Consumer Lawsuits as Privacy Talks Drag, POLITICO (June 
5, 2019, 11:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/05/privacy-advocates-
consumer-lawsuits-1478824 [https://perma.cc/9RLX-E8MC] (describing the different 
approaches and challenges lawmakers face in drafting privacy proposals). 
 30. See Mitchell Noordyke, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L 
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFS., https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ 
[https://perma.cc/8T7V-BV3J] (last updated Oct. 15, 2019) (evaluating state data privacy 
laws). 
 31. Although enacted in 2018, the CCPA will go into effect on January 1, 2020.  
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.198 
(West 2018); see also John Stephens, California Consumer Privacy Act, ABA (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/
2019/201902/fa_9/ [https://perma.cc/V3MY-KZ7F] (overview of CCPA requirements and 
implications for businesses). 
 32. See Lauren Davis, Note, The Impact of the California Consumer Privacy Act on 
Financial Institutions Across the Nation, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. Part V (2020) (discussing 
the effect of the CCPA on financial institutions’ privacy compliance efforts). 
 33. See Noordyke, supra note 30 (tracking state data privacy efforts); see also Lazzarotti 
et al., supra note 4 (explaining changes in state data privacy laws). 
 34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.198 (West 2018); Louisiana Internet 
and Social Media Privacy and Protection Act, H.B. 465, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (La. 
2019); NYPA, S.B. S5642, 2019–2020, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Pennsylvania Consumer Data 
Privacy Act, H.B. 1049, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); Rhode Island 
Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 
2019); see also Noordyke, supra note 30 (comparing state data privacy laws). 
 35. See Noordyke, supra note 30 (evaluating state data privacy proposals). 
 36. See id. (discussing trends among state data privacy legislation). 
 37. See id. (analyzing state data privacy proposals). 
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privacy bills further impose unique obligations on companies, such as 
mandatory data privacy assessments38 and fiduciary duty requirements.39   
Some argue that federal privacy legislation should not preempt 
state laws because each state serves as a “laboratory” of democracy that 
experiment with innovative approaches to protect its citizens.40  
However, a uniform federal regulatory approach would be more 
appropriate because of “the inherently interstate nature of electronic 
commerce and associated data breaches.”41  Preemption is crucial to the 
federal data privacy law debate because one federal law would greatly 
simplify industry compliance efforts in the long run by establishing 
uniform national standards.42   
Further, a federal standard would ensure that consumers receive 
the same privacy rights and data protections regardless of where they may 
live.43  Privacy legislation should balance the convenience gained from 
preempting state laws against the potential loss of strong consumer 
protections afforded by state data privacy laws.44  To serve both the 
interests of the banking industry and its consumers, lawmakers should 
enact a comprehensive federal data privacy law with robust consumer 
 
 38. See, e.g., Minnesota Privacy Act, H. F. 2917, 2019–2020 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 
2019); Washington Privacy Act, S.B. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). 
 39. See, e.g., NYPA, S.B. S5642, 2019-2020 N.Y. State Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
 40. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
see also Privacy Preemption Watch, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/preemption/ [https://perma.cc/J8GC-ST9P] (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019) (addressing the influence of state data privacy laws on the evolution of data privacy 
rights). 
 41. Alden F. Abbot, The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Online Security: Data 
Protector or Dictator?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/report/the-federal-trade-commissions-role-online-security-data-
protector-or-dictator [https://perma.cc/VCS4-Y5YU]. 
 42. Alan McQuinn & Daniel Castro, A Grand Bargain on Data Privacy Legislation for 
America, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 13 (Jan. 2019) http://www2.itif.org/2019-grand-
bargain-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTS7-G8E4] (discussing the benefits of preemption in 
context of a federal data privacy law). 
 43. AM. BANKERS ASS’N,  Comment Letter to the Senate’s Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs Request for Information about the Protection of Consumer 
Information (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Data%20Submission_American%20Banker
s%20Association%20(ABA)1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4T8-TTHY]. 
 44. See Adam J. Levitt & Amy E. Keller, Insight: Cyber Wolves in CEOs’ Clothing-
Business Leaders Thwart Privacy Efforts, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 9, 2019, 4:01 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insight-cyber-wolves-in-ceos-
clothing-business-leaders-thwart-privacy-efforts [https://perma.cc/EVX8-MVUS] 
(discussing consumer privacy protections that CEOs urge be included in federal data privacy 
legislation). 
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protections that expressly preempts existing state data privacy laws.45  
Therefore, a federal data privacy law should include the most protective 
aspects of state laws to avoid  watering down consumer protections.46  
Conversely, opponents argue that a broadly preemptive federal 
privacy law would be difficult to enact and amend.47  An expressly 
preemptive federal privacy law would be difficult to enact because 
preemption is a divisive issue that lawmakers have not been able to 
settle.48  Furthermore, a preemptive federal law would be challenging to 
amend because industry stakeholders and consumer advocates could get 
congressional support and interfere with efforts to change it.49  However, 
one way to combat this is to include a “sunset provision”50 that would 
allow legislators to consider the law’s effectiveness and address issues 
that may have arisen since implementation.51  For example, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) contained a series of sunset provisions.52  
When those sunset provisions neared expiration, Congress amended the 
FCRA with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act in 2003 to 
increase the law’s protections.53  A sunset provision that sets a time limit 
on federal preemption can serve as “a safeguard against regulatory 
ossification”54 in the face of rapidly changing technologies.55 
 
 45. See id. (advocating for comprehensive consumer protections in future federal data 
privacy legislation). 
 46. See Chin & Odell, supra note 28 (“While some panelists positioned a preemptive 
federal law as beneficial for both businesses and consumers, through setting clear and uniform 
rules across the nation; they also emphasized that any preemptive law would need to be 
substantial enough to protect consumers.”); see also Levitt & Keller, supra note 44 
(discussing the need for privacy legislation to have strong protections like the CCPA to avoid 
a watered-down bill that gives the appearance of protecting consumers). 
 47. See Gruwell, supra note 20 (discussing the significance of preemption in the privacy 
debate); Schwartz, supra note 21, at 928 (addressing the challenges of preemptive federal 
laws). 
 48. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 928 (explaining the obstacles lawmakers face to enact 
preemptive federal data privacy legislation). 
 49. Additionally, such legislation would likely “become outdated as technological 
changes undermine such a statute’s regulatory assumptions.”  See id. at 946. 
 50. A sunset provision is a provision that will expire after a certain amount of time. See 
id. at 946 (addressing sunset provisions in the context of preemption). 
 51. See id. at 945 (discussing sunset provisions as a way to draft preemptive statutes). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 946. 
 54. Ossification “means a lack of meaningful changes over time within and without [the 
federal statute] in response to new conditions” as it relates to a federal statute’s preemption 
of state laws.  Id. at 928 (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. at 946. 
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B. Amending the GLBA 
The U.S. has a sectoral approach to federal privacy regulation, 
which means that privacy laws only apply to certain industries, like the 
GLBA’s application to financial institutions.56  Although consumers of 
financial institutions have benefitted from the GLBA’s privacy 
protections, the Act has come under scrutiny.57  To comply with the 
GLBA, financial institutions must “respect the privacy of its customers 
and . . . protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ 
nonpublic personal information.”58  The GLBA defines consumers’ 
“nonpublic personal information” to be “personally identifiable financial 
information” that a financial institution obtains related to providing a 
financial product or service to an individual, unless that data is otherwise 
available to the public.59  
Despite the GLBA’s privacy protections, the Act’s narrow scope 
excludes other kinds of personal information collected and used by 
financial institutions, information that should be protected as well.60  For 
example, financial institutions gather information about visitors to their 
websites or mobile applications for visits unrelated to financial services 
or opening of an account.61  Banks may then use that consumer data 
internally for marketing purposes and externally by selling that 
information to third parties.62  Additionally, the GLBA does not protect 
information connected to data use related to marketing or data analytics.63  
 
 56. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Notice of 
Request for Public Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 187, 48602 (proposed Sept. 26, 2018) (“For users 
of products and services in several sectors (e.g., healthcare, education, financial services), 
specific laws cover how organizations handle personal information. Where no sector-specific 
laws apply, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority to ensure that 
organizations are not deceiving consumers or operating unfairly.”). 
 57. See Luke Dembosky et al., The California Consumer Privacy Act: Compliance 
Strategies for Financial Institutions, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON 1 (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2019/04/the-california-consumer-privacy-
act [https://perma.cc/29ZS-GY8V] (discussing the effects of the CCPA on financial 
institutions and compliance considerations). 
 58. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2018). 
 59. Id. § 6809(4); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1016.1–.17 (2018) (setting forth the CFPB’s financial 
privacy rule, Regulation P, which regulates banks privacy practices). 
 60. See Dembosky et al., supra note 57 (addressing the consequences of the CCPA on 
privacy practices of financial institutions). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (explaining information that falls outside of the CCPA’s GLBA exemption). 
 63. See id. (discussing the effects of the CCPA on financial institutions subject to the 
GLBA and their compliance considerations).  Data analytics involves analyzing raw data 
using algorithms to draw conclusions about that data. Avantika Monnappa, Data Science Vs. 
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The Act excludes information about financial institutions’ job applicants, 
contractors, and employees.64  Further, while the GLBA ensures that 
customers have an opportunity to “opt out” of data transfers to 
unaffiliated parties of financial institutions, it provides multiple 
exceptions to the opt-out requirement that allow financial institutions to 
ignore a customer’s request to not have her data transferred to non-
affiliates.65 
Future federal legislation should address the shortcomings of the 
GLBA either by amending the GLBA provisions related to data privacy,66 
providing carve-outs for GLBA provisions related to data privacy,67 or 
doing a combination of both.68  For instance, lawmakers could adopt a 
compromised approach to provide robust protections for consumers and 
ease compliance challenges.69  This approach could preempt state laws, 
like the CCPA, while incorporating the CCPA’s approach to defining 
personal information70 and providing a limited carve-out for the GLBA.71  
The CCPA provides a GLBA exemption for financial institutions subject 
to GLBA data protection requirements.72  Such a compromised approach 
would allow banks to continue complying with the GLBA’s privacy 
provisions while requiring them to satisfy the parts of the CCPA that 
protects consumer data not covered by the GLBA.73   
 
Big Data Vs. Data Analytics, SIMPLILEARN (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.simplilearn.com/data-science-vs-big-data-vs-data-analytics-article 
[https://perma.cc/G34A-4SGC]. 
 64. Dembosky et al., supra note 57. 
 65. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (2018); see 
also The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/glba/ [https://perma.cc/SF9C-NJ8A] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) 
(discussing problems with consumer data protection under GLBA). 
 66. Rubin, supra note 11. 
 67. Based on amendments to the CCPA in September 2018, the CCPA provides entities 
covered by the GLBA a limited exemption by exempting from the CCPA “personal 
information collected, processed, sold or disclosed” under the GLBA and its implementing 
regulations.  California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.145(e) (West 2018). 
 68. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 904 (addressing different approaches lawmakers can 
take to address preemption). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See infra Part III for analysis of the definition of personal information. 
 71. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 904; see also Dembosky et al., supra note 57 (explaining 
the CCPA-related compliance challenges that financial institutions will face). 
 72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(e). 
 73. See Dembosky et al., supra note 57 (addressing challenges financial institutions will 
face under the CCPA). 
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Although tracking GLBA-covered information makes 
compliance more difficult for financial institutions, banks should weigh 
those difficulties against the ease of compliance of a federal data privacy 
law which preempts state laws.74  Ultimately, a strong comprehensive 
federal privacy law should replace the aspects of the GLBA that relate to 
data privacy only if it provides consumers with stronger protections.75 
III.  AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AND ENTITIES COVERED UNDER 
THE GLBA 
In order to justify preemption of state data privacy laws and 
amending the GLBA’s privacy provisions, future data privacy legislation 
should include clear and all-encompassing definitions of the data and 
entities covered.76  Broad definitions under federal data privacy 
legislation will protect a large swath of consumer personal data and 
ensure that preemption of state laws does not erode consumer 
protections.77  Because federal regulators have suggested implementing 
a risk-based data privacy framework, which would implement safeguards 
based on the sensitivity of the information, lawmakers should extend this 
concept to the definitions of personal information.78  Federal privacy 
legislation should distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive 
personal information in their definitions of personal information.79  The 
scope of the definition of personal information is important, as it will 
affect how companies engage in commercial activity and innovation.80  
Therefore, lawmakers should balance a broad definition of personal 
information with tiers of privacy requirements based on the sensitivity of 
consumer information.81  
This approach of providing protections based on the risk level of 
data is a calculated method of balancing compliance costs against 
 
 74. Financial institutions should recognize that a uniform regulatory approach to all 
categories of personal information would better protect their consumers.  See id. (discussing 
the effects of the CCPA on financial institutions and compliance considerations). 
 75. See id. (explaining CCPA compliance challenges). 
 76. See id. (evaluating the effects of data privacy legislation on financial institutions). 
 77. See id. (comparing the scope of CCPA and GLBA). 
 78. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Hearing 12: April 10 Session 2 Remarks by FTC 
Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Session 1 Presentations on Data Breaches (Apr. 
10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/video/ftc-hearing-12-april-10-
session-2-remarks-ftc-commissioner-rebecca  [https://perma.cc/8X4H-CKVQ]. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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consumer benefits.82  Researchers have noted that increased privacy 
protections do not necessarily lead to increased digital trust and use by 
consumers.83  Consequently, legislators should not require the industry to 
provide the same high level of protection to both sensitive and non-
sensitive data because such an approach would unnecessarily overburden 
financial institutions.84   
Current legislative proposals, however, have provided limited 
definitions of information covered.85  The Information Transparency and 
Personal Data Control Act86 (“Data Control Act”) defines sensitive 
information as “information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual,” including government created identification, verification 
credentials, call records, biometric data, sexual preferences, and 
religion.87  “Sensitive information” excludes behavioral information, 
such as a user’s web and app usage, geolocation data, and email address.88  
Slightly more inclusive than the Data Control Act, the Social Media 
Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 201989 (“Consumer 
Rights Act”) defines personal information more broadly as “individually 
identifiable information about an individual collected online.”90  This 
definition includes nonpublic personal information under the GLBA,91 
 
 82. See McQuinn & Castro, supra note 42, at 5 (“Policymakers getting [the] balance 
[between privacy protections and innovation] wrong can deter innovation and harm 
consumers because overly stringent regulation raises costs and reduces the relative quality of 
digital technologies, thereby negatively impact the people who use them.”). 
 83. See id. (“Privacy and security protections are important because rules that are too 
weak can make users feel uneasy about adopting technologies and services. However, beyond 
a baseline of protections, stronger privacy protections do not translate into more digital trust 
and therefore more digital adoption and use.”). 
 84. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (explaining the advantages and 
disadvantages of a risk-based approach to privacy protections). 
 85. See Lazzarotti et al., supra note 4 (discussing changes in state data privacy laws). 
 86. Representative Suzan K. DelBene (D-WA) first introduced this bill on September 20, 
2018.  Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019).  She reintroduced this bill on March 
29, 2019.  Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. The Data Control Act does not address the GLBA directly, but it does mention the 
GLBA indirectly by protecting state laws that impose stronger requirements on financial 
institutions than the GLBA. Id. 
 89. Senators John Kennedy (R-LA) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) first introduced the 
Consumer Rights Act on April 23, 2018.  Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act of 
2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019).  They reintroduced this bill again on January 17, 2019.  Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4) (2018).  The 
Consumer Rights Act’s incorporation of the GLBA’s definition of nonpublic personal 
information is this bill’s only mention of the GLBA, and presumably, this means that financial 
institutions would have to continue to comply with the GLBA.  Social Media Privacy and 
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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protected health information under the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act of 199692 (“HIPAA”), and location information that 
would identify the name of a consumer’s street and a city, a physical 
address, an email address, and a telephone number.93  Although the 
Consumer Rights Act protects more kinds of consumer personal data, 
legislators should ensure that a future definition of personal information 
is expansive enough to protect consumers across a sufficient range of 
business activities.94  
Furthermore, a federal data privacy law should define and address 
sensitive personal data as a subset of personal information that should 
receive additional protections, similar to the Data Control Act and the 
Balancing the Rights of Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 
201995 (“BROWSER Act”).96  Both bills provide separate definitions and 
protections for sensitive personal information, which is information that 
personally identifies an individual, and non-sensitive personal 
information, which is anonymized or publicly available data.97  However, 
both the BROWSER Act and the Data Control Act afford little protection 
for non-sensitive personal information.98  Non-sensitive personal 
information should receive protection under a preemptive federal data 
privacy law because many consumers value the privacy of their non-
sensitive information as well.99  A distinction between sensitive personal 
data and personal information will help ensure that the financial services 
industry is efficiently protecting its consumers’ data.100 
In order to preempt other laws without significantly reducing 
consumer protections, Congress should consider the most expansive 
definition of covered data currently at the state-level, which is presently 
the definition of “personal information” under the CCPA.101  The 
 
 92. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018). 
 93. Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) introduced the BROWSER Act on April 10, 2019.  
BROWSER Act, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 96. The BROWSER Act states that it would not supersede any existing federal privacy 
laws; therefore, if this bill passes, financial institutions would have to continue to comply with 
the GLBA. Id. 
 97. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong.; BROWSER Act, S. 1116, 116th Cong. 
 98. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.140(o)(1) (West 2018); see Davis, supra note 32 (addressing the impact of the CCPA 
on financial institutions). 
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CCPA’s definition covers “information that identifies, relates to, 
describes, or is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”102  
Therefore, the CCPA’s expansive scope applies to nearly every kind of 
information a business could collect about an individual.103  Federal 
privacy legislation should include such an expansive definition of 
personal data.104  Although compliance with this definition will be 
challenging for financial institutions, it is a worthwhile compromise to 
avoid the substantial difficulties banks would otherwise face navigating 
a patchwork of state laws with varying requirements and definitions of 
covered data.105   
IV.  USER CONSENT AND  USER RIGHTS TO ACCESS, WITHDRAW, 
CORRECT, AND DELETE 
User consent is a common theme across legislative proposals,106 
and federal data privacy legislation should include a robust user control 
and consent framework.107  User control and consent is a fundamental 
aspect of establishing and maintaining consumer trust.108  Consumers of 
 
 102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1). 
 103. See Christopher A. Ott, Q&A: Privacy and Security Partner Christopher Ott on the 
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE: PRIVACY & SECURITY 
L. BLOG (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy—security-law-
blog/2018/08/qa-privacy-and-security-partner-christopher-ott-on 
[https://perma.cc/M64V-D4QX] (“The CCPA applies to broadly defined personal 
information of California residents collected by businesses, regardless of how the collection 
is done, or the type of industry in which the business operates.”). 
 104. See id. (discussing compliance challenges presented by CCPA). 
 105. See id. (addressing legal issues presented by the CCPA and the GLBA). 
 106. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy and 
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); Balancing the Rights of Web 
Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 107. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (analyzing the benefits of the notice and 
consent framework to provide transparency and a degree of user control in the context of 
digital privacy). 
 108. See id. (discussing the history of the notice and consent framework and its role in 
consumer protections); see also Pat Conroy et al., Building Consumer Trust, DELOITTE (Nov. 
14, 2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/risk-management/consumer-data-
privacy-strategies.html 
  [https://perma.cc/9WVQ-JXJT] (“[Fifty-nine] percent of consumers state that the 
knowledge of a data breach at a company would negatively impact their likelihood of buying 
from that company.”).  Although consumer consent is important for consumer trust, the 
“privacy paradox” is relevant to consider. Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Policy 
and Competition, Report, BROOKINGS INST. 7 (Dec. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/ES-12.04.19-Marthews-Tucker.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CTB-
GKC4]. This phenomenon describes contradictory consumer behavior  involving consumers 
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the financial services industry should expect all industry stakeholders to 
offer control over their data.109  This requirement across industries will 
increase consumer trust in online activities, an important source of 
economic opportunity.110  Many companies provide privacy protections 
that generally require some degree of consent from consumers for a 
company’s ability to use consumer information, and this can take the 
form of “opt-in consent” or “opt-out consent.”111  
Opt-in consent is a stronger method of consumer control and 
requires affirmative action by a user to explicitly grant a company 
permission to use the consumer’s information.112  For example, opt-in 
consent often consists of a user clicking on a checkbox next to a statement 
that says “I agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy,” or on a button 
that says “I agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.”113  On the 
other hand, opt-out consent is passive consent, such that a consumer’s 
consent to a company’s use of the consumer’s information is presumed, 
unless the consumer affirmatively objects.114  Opt-out consent could take 
the form of a user unchecking a pre-checked box next to a statement of 
agreement to undo the user’s assumed affirmation, or providing users 
with the option to withdraw consent by clicking on a link, such as the 
ubiquitous “unsubscribe” link in marketing emails.115   
Future federal data privacy should require companies to provide 
consumers with the ability to opt out of businesses’ use of non-sensitive 
personal data and to seek additional opt-in consent for sensitive consumer 
data.116  The Data Control Act, for instance, requires that companies, by 
 
stating that they desire and value privacy, yet consumers do not behave in accordance with 
their desires and frequently trade away their privacy for convenience, goods, or services.  See 
id. (“An illustration of the privacy paradox is, who show that though MIT students in general 
acted in a way which accorded with their stated privacy preferences in terms of sharing 
information, when these students were offered pizza they started sharing information even if 
previously they had stated a greater preference for keeping their information private.”). 
 109. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (addressing the benefits of the providing 
user control over personal data in the context of digital privacy). 
 110. See Conroy et al., supra note 108 (explaining the importance of trust for commercial 
activity online). 
 111. KJ Dearie, Opt In vs Opt Out, TERMLY (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://termly.io/resources/articles/opt-in-vs-opt-out/ [https://perma.cc/PH35-JFNB] 
(explaining the difference between opt-in and opt-out consent). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Bernard, supra note 10 (arguing for a comprehensive federal data privacy law).  
The GLBA provides consumers of financial institutions the right to opt out of allowing 
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default, obtain opt-in consent for collecting, using, or sharing users’ 
sensitive personal information, while providing users the right to opt out 
of sharing their non-sensitive personal information.117  Unlike other bills, 
the Data Control Act provides a “reasonable expectation of users” 
exception to the “opt-in consent” requirement.118  Pursuant to this 
exception, companies need not obtain such consent for the use of 
“sensitive personal information or behavioral data” where this use “does 
not deviate from purposes consistent with a [company’s] relationship 
with users as understood by the reasonable user.”119  This carve-out is so 
expansive that it could defeat the opt-in consent requirements’s protective 
purpose—companies could use it to cover their actions beyond data use 
related to their operations.120  Legislators should exercise caution in 
providing such broad exemptions because a preemptive federal data 
privacy law should not create gaps that weaken consumer rights to opt in 
or opt out of sharing personal data.121 
Consumers should have the ability to control their personal data 
with options to access, withdraw, correct, and delete their personal 
data.122  Existing federal sectoral privacy laws123 and state laws124 already 
recognize the importance of providing consumers such rights.  While the 
provision of these rights may seem daunting to companies, they have 
symbolic value that help strengthen companies’ relationships with their 
 
financial institutions to share consumers’ nonpublic personal information with most non-
affiliated third parties. 12 C.F.R. § 1016.1(a)(3) (2018). 
 117. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.; see also Levitt & Keller, supra note 44 (recommending consumer privacy 
protections for federal data privacy legislation). 
 121. See id. (discussing consumer privacy protections for federal data privacy legislation). 
 122. See Mark Sullivan, As Google Turns 20, It Can’t Take Our Goodwill for Granted, 
FAST COMPANY (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90243161/as-google-turns-
20-it-cant-take-our-goodwill-for-granted [https://perma.cc/48GX-TQTS] (discussing the 
importance of transparency of consumer data). 
 123. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524, 164.526  (2018) (outlining patient rights to request a copy 
of protected health information and to amend protected health information under the privacy 
rule of the HIPAA); But see 12 C.F.R. § 1016.1 (2018) (providing consumers the right to opt 
out of sharing nonpublic personal information but does not provide consumers any right to 
correct or receive a copy of nonpublic personal information under the GLBA’s Regulation P). 
 124. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 
1798.100–1798.199 (West 2018) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and 
shared); Pennsylvania Consumer Data Privacy Act, H.B. 1049, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and shared); 
Rhode Island Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (R.I. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and shared); see also 
Noordyke, supra note 30 (comparing of state data privacy laws). 
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customers, particularly when companies use and share consumer data to 
engage in marketing and to maintain partnerships with third party service 
providers.125 
Although no federal legislative proposal provides consumers the 
right to correct information about themselves, industry and regulatory 
stakeholders generally support this right.126  Additionally, the proposed 
Consumer Rights Act 127 and several state laws128 provide consumers the 
right to delete their data.129  Some federal data privacy proposals130 
provide users with the right to access the information a company has 
about them and to withdraw consent provided earlier, which many 
industry stakeholders support.131  If federal data privacy legislation is to 
preempt state laws, legislators should include these various rights to 
control data to ensure a sufficiently robust federal privacy law that 
provides rights comparable to those offered at the state level.132  A 
 
 125. Sullivan, supra note 122. 
 126. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Notice of Request 
for Public Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 187, 48602 (proposed Sept. 26, 2018) (outlining the 
Administration’s privacy goals and recommending that companies should provide reasonable 
control to users, including the right to correct consumer information in certain circumstances); 
Framework for Consumer Privacy Legislation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE 4 (Dec. 2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/privacy_report_PDF_005.pdf  [https://perma.cc/JA46-
4DBQ] (proposing user controls, such as the right to correct, in federal privacy legislation). 
 127. The Consumer Rights Act limits this right to instances where a user deletes their 
account or otherwise terminates use of a company’s platform.  Social Media Privacy and 
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019).  Additionally, the Consumer 
Rights Act allows consumers to request a company delete their personal information after a 
company experiences a privacy breach.  Id. 
 128. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.198. 
 129. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. at 
48602 (recommending that companies should provide reasonable control to users, which 
includes the right to access, withdraw, correct, and delete consumer information in certain 
circumstances); Framework for Consumer Privacy Legislation, supra note 126, at 4 
(“Consumers should be able to require an organization to delete their personal data collected 
by an organization, when such data is no longer required to be maintained under applicable 
law or is no longer necessary for legitimate business purposes of the organization.”). 
 130. Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(F) (2019); Social Media Privacy 
Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. § 3(b) (2019). 
 131. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Fed. Reg. at 48601 
(advocating user data control rights); Framework for Consumer Privacy Legislation, supra 
note 126, at 3 (proposing inclusion of user controls in future data privacy legislation). 
 132. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (providing consumers the right to access 
data collected and shared); Pennsylvania Consumer Data Privacy Act, H.B. 1049, 2019–2020 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected 
and shared); Rhode Island Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019) (providing consumers the right to access data collected and 
shared); see also Noordyke, supra note 30 (comparing state data privacy legislation). 
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uniform set of rights will provide consumers control without 
overburdening companies and interfering with their operations.133  
V.  ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
A. The FTC and State Attorneys General  
Although other federal agencies may currently enforce the 
privacy provisions of federal sectoral privacy laws, such as the CFPB’s 
enforcement of the GLBA’s Regulation P,134 stakeholders strongly 
support making the FTC the primary enforcer of a federal data privacy 
law.135  Because of the FTC’s experience and existing role in protecting 
data privacy across many industries, supporters argue that the FTC is best 
positioned to enforce a comprehensive federal privacy law that would 
apply across all industries.136  The FTC uses its general authority under 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”) to 
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices.137  In the 
data privacy sphere, the FTC considers whether companies are engaging 
in unfair and deceptive practices by using consumer data in a manner that 
conflicts with the companies’ published privacy policies or related public 
 
 133. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78. 
 134. If legislators provide carve-outs for existing sector-specific federal privacy laws, such 
as the GLBA, under a comprehensive federal privacy law, then federal agencies, such as the 
CFPB, will continue to enforce the privacy provisions of their respective sector-specific 
privacy laws.  See supra Part II (discussing amendment of the GLBA). 
 135. Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. at 
48602 (recommending the FTC be the primary enforcement agency); Balancing the Rights of 
Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. § 6 (2019) 
(designating the FTC as the primary enforcement agency); Social Media Privacy and 
Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. § 4 (2019) (designating the FTC as the 
primary enforcement agency); Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 4 (2019) 
(designating the FTC as the primary enforcement agency); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-52, INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AUTHORITY 
COULD ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY 1 (2019) (offering an 
overview of a range of stakeholders’ views of enforcement of federal privacy law); But see 
David Meyer, Who Should Enforce a US Federal Privacy Law?, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. 
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/who-should-enforce-a-federal-privacy-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/2D72-8ZA8] (explaining that privacy advocates’ call for the creation of a 
new agency to oversee data privacy enforcement of a federal privacy law). 
 136. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Fed. Reg. at 
48602 (addressing the role of the FTC in future data privacy enforcement efforts). 
 137. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”) § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) 
(2018). 
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statements and whether companies are not delivering on their promises 
to safeguard personal data from unauthorized use.138  
The FTC principally uses enforcement actions139 against 
organizations that fail to protect consumers’ privacy and personal data as 
a way to end the unlawful behavior and to compel violators to remediate 
their illegal actions.140  For example, an FTC order can require companies 
to adopt privacy and security programs, to conduct biennial assessments 
by independent assessors to ensure compliance with settlement terms, or 
to offer consumers tools for transparency and choice.141  Additionally, 
the FTC may obligate companies to compensate harmed consumers, 
disgorge unlawful financial gains, or delete consumer data obtained 
unlawfully.142  
However, the FTC’s limited ability to issue civil penalties 
restricts its ability to enforce data privacy measures.143  Furthermore, the 
FTC does not have civil penalty authority144 under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, meaning the FTC cannot impose direct civil penalties on 
organizations for first-time violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act.145  The 
FTC may only seek civil penalties when an entity has violated a consent 
order, a statute, or rule that explicitly provides for civil penalty 
authority.146   
 
 138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 135, at 9–10 (explaining how the 
FTC enforces data privacy). 
 139. The FTC’s data privacy enforcement activities consist of litigation and consent 
decrees, similar to a settlement agreement.  See id. (mentioning the different accountability 
mechanisms the FTC uses in its data privacy efforts). 
 140. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2018 2 (2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ5P-3NNT].  For 
example, the FTC found that Lenovo, a large computer manufacturing company, had violated 
the safety of its customers’ information because Lenovo had pre-loaded software on its 
laptops that displayed advertisements to its customers. Lenovo, Inc., 82 Fed. Reg. 43013, 
43015 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 13, 2017) (Consent Agreement).  Lenovo settled with the FTC and 
had to provide consumers with certain security protections to allow them “to opt out, disable 
or remove all of the covered software’s operations.” Id. 
 141. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 140. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 135, at 1 (explaining restraints on 
FTC enforcement powers). 
 144. See id. at 10, n.23 (“Civil penalty authority gives an agency the ability to seek a 
monetary remedy from an entity that has violated a statute or regulation.”). 
 145. Id. at 20. 
 146. Id. at 10. 
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Federal data privacy legislation should remedy this enforcement 
gap by providing the FTC authority to impose civil penalties on 
companies for first-time violations of Section 5.147  Proponents state that 
the FTC’s current financial payment and fining regime does not impose 
high enough costs to adequately discourage bad behavior.148  Many 
businesses currently consider these FTC payments “a cost of doing 
business.”149  Civil penalties are a concrete method to keep companies 
accountable to the law and will have an amplified deterrent effect on 
companies in conjunction with the other payments the FTC can require 
from violators.150  
In addition to FTC enforcement, federal data privacy legislation 
should consider extending state Attorney General (“AG”) authority to 
bring enforcement actions on behalf of their residents.151  Some 
legislative proposals include provisions granting AGs such authority.152  
Supporters of AG enforcement authority argue that enforcement 
authority should not be too centralized and overburden one regulator, 
especially considering the increased enforcement workload that will 
inevitably result from a new federal privacy law.153  Furthermore, AGs 
are likely better equipped than the FTC to represent their residents’ 
interests in litigation.154  AGs can effectively draw upon prior experience 
 
 147. Id. at 35. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. (explaining the role of penalties in FTC enforcement efforts); But see FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (“[T]he FTC Act today does not include civil penalties for 
first-time violations [because]. . . . [y]ou cannot marry an incredibly broad law that is 
incredibly vague with the ability to impose penalties upon a company that simply fails to 
predict where a line is drawn.”). 
 151. Meyer, supra note 135. 
 152. See, e.g., Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th 
Cong. § 4(b) (2019); Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019). 
 153. See Meyer, supra note 135 (“There’s no way that one agency, even an emboldened 
and better funded FTC, can really deal with what’s going on [in terms of data practices in the 
marketplace].”) (quotation omitted); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (“[W]e really want 
a situation where there’s lots of different regulators, like attorneys general, state attorneys 
generals who are empowered to do the kinds of investigations that we need to have real 
transparency and real accountability.”); Citron, supra note 23, at 799 (“Federal authorities 
cannot attend to most privacy and security problems because their resources are limited and 
their duties ever expanding.”). 
 154. See Meyer, supra note 135 (“[W]hen cases involve granular, geolocation-based 
personalization or where the data practices of a mom-and-pop store are in question, it makes 
sense for the states to play an important role.”); see e.g., Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. 
Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Trade Acts and Practices 
Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 209, 257 (2016) (“Now, with 
increased storage of consumer data and a rise in security breaches, state attorneys general and 
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enforcing data privacy protections in their states as well as their local 
expertise.155  Although opponents worry that AG involvement may lead 
“to over-enforcement [that] overwhelms companies,”156 AG enforcement 
is important to ensure that consumers’ interests are adequately protected 
under a federal privacy law that preempts state privacy laws.157  
Otherwise, consumers would lose a large source of existing protection 
through AG enforcement activity under the current regime.158 
B. Private Right of Action 
While some states provide consumers with a private right of 
action, most notably the CCPA,159 none of the current federal legislative 
proposals offer this source of accountability to allow consumers to take 
companies to court for federal privacy law violations.160  A private right 
of action is a legal mechanism that increases corporate liability and 
further incentivizes companies to follow data privacy law.161  Yet, some 
critics of a private right of action consider FTC enforcement alone to be 
more effective in keeping companies accountable than private law 
claims.162  These critics also state that private rights of action will lead to 
frivolous litigation that will hinder innovation in the marketplace and 
reduce resources that companies could use to safeguard consumer 
privacy.163  
 
class action lawyers are increasingly bringing actions under state [unfair or deceptive trade 
acts and practices] laws and other legal theories.”); Citron, supra note 23, at 799 (“If 
enforcement were solely in the hands of federal agencies, local matters would surely be 
overlooked. . . . [because] [t]he FTC has brought a little over fifty data security cases in the 
past ten years due to limited resources.”). 
 155. Citron, supra note 23, at 801. 
 156. Id. at 796 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). 
 157. Id. at 798. 
 158. Id. (“State enforcers are essential to the efficient deterrence of privacy and data 
security violations given the increasing marginalization of private law and the practical 
constraints on federal agencies.”). 
 159. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–
1798.198 (West 2018); NYPA, S.B. S5642, 2019–2020, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Rhode Island 
Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.B. S0234, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2019). 
 160. See, e.g., Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy 
and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); Balancing the Rights of Web 
Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 161. Hendel & Lima, supra note 29. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See McQuinn & Castro, supra note 42, at 61 (discussing the disadvantages of a 
private right of action in privacy legislation); see also Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 
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Despite these critiques, Congress should ultimately incorporate a 
limited private right of action because tailored language and careful 
drafting can alleviate opponents’ concerns about frivolous litigation.164  
Lawmakers can draft a narrow private right of action through statutory 
design by limiting private lawsuits to breaches of certain kinds of 
personal data, such as sensitive data.165  Additionally, lawmakers can 
impose statutory damages for violations of certain provisions of the 
federal privacy law that are easier to comply with, like data access rights, 
rather than for violations of any provision of the law.166  Legislators can 
also consider requiring that plaintiffs show tangible harm167 or even 
imposing an element of intent for statutory violations, such as willful 
violations.168  A limited private right of action can reduce industry 
concerns about frivolous litigation while providing strong consumer 
protections to justify preemption of existing privacy laws by a future 
federal data privacy law.169  
A multi-level enforcement regime through state, federal, and 
private enforcement activity will help correct existing litigation 
challenges related to private law claims based on privacy harm.170  Courts 
impose high standards for plaintiffs to prove privacy harm and often 
 
(explaining the political disagreements interfering with Congress’s ability to pass a 
comprehensive federal data privacy law). 
 164. Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 (“Privacy advocates like the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation say Republican concerns about excessive lawsuits can be addressed by careful 
legislative drafting . . . .”). 
 165. Joseph Jerome, Private Right of Action Shouldn’t Be a Yes or No Proposition in 
Federal Privacy Legislation, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/private-right-of-action-shouldnt-be-a-yes-no-proposition-in-federal-
privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/AF82-ZFBQ] (explaining ways legislators can limit a 
private right of action in future federal privacy proposals). 
 166. Id. 
 167. However, privacy advocates argue that lawmakers should not limit redress for 
privacy violations to “requiring a showing of a monetary loss or other tangible harm and 
[instead] should make clear that the invasion of privacy itself is a concrete and individualized 
injury.”  Public Interest Privacy Legislation Principles, 
https://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Public_Interest_Privacy_Principle
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD8Z-P3CH] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 168. Jerome, supra note 165 (addressing limitations that lawmakers can impose on a 
private right of action in future federal privacy legislation). 
 169. See Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 (“What would make the most sense is to have a 
strong enforceable federal law[, said California state Sen. Hannah-Beth Jackson].”). 
 170. See also Citron, supra note 23 (discussing benefits of enforcement authority shared 
between federal regulators and AGs in context of data privacy). 
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dismiss claims based on lack of “injury in fact.”171  As a result, courts 
make it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in privacy tort claims,172 
negligence claims, contract claims, and private claims based on state 
unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices law.173  
Strong enforcement mechanisms help incentivize companies to 
follow a future privacy law.174  If a future federal privacy law will, in fact, 
serve as the baseline for consumer privacy protections, legislators should 
include public enforcement by the FTC and AGs and a limited private 
right of action in data privacy legislation.175 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Preemption of state law may be a key component of effective 
federal privacy legislation.176  Notwithstanding the benefits of 
preemption, lawmakers should only include a provision that preempts 
state privacy laws if the federal privacy bill includes other essential 
elements.177  These elements include a broad definition of personal data, 
robust user control rights, expanded FTC powers, AG enforcement rights, 
and a limited private right of action.178  Otherwise, federal privacy 
legislation that lacks these safeguards and preempts existing state laws is 
“a watered-down bill that gives the appearance of protecting 
consumers.”179  Ultimately, lawmakers will need to combine these key 
 
 171. See id. at 798 (explaining difficulties injured consumers face in pursuing privacy-
related litigation); see, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft 
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding claimant failed to present “injury in fact”). 
 172. See Citron, supra note 23, at 798 (addressing challenges for plaintiffs bringing 
privacy torts such as “intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and 
misappropriation of image . . . .”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Hendel & Lima, supra note 29 (addressing private right of action in federal 
privacy law as an effective legal mechanism for accountability). 
 175. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (considering important issues and 
protections that lawmakers must consider for federal privacy legislation); see also Hendel & 
Lima, supra note 29 (addressing consumer protections to include in future federal privacy 
law). 
 176. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 945 (explaining various approaches to preemption in 
context of privacy law). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (evaluating consumer protections that 
legislators should include in federal data privacy law). 
 179. See Levitt & Keller, supra note 44 (explaining data privacy provisions that future 
federal legislation should include like a private right of action); see also Schwartz, supra note 
21, at 945 (discussing different perspectives on preemption of state data privacy laws). 
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points to strike a balance between robust consumer protections and 
flexibility for companies to continue their operations and to innovate.180 
Future data privacy law should include mechanisms for 
companies to provide transparency and control to consumers over their 
personal data without being overly prescriptive in how companies should 
achieve these goals.181  For instance, legislators should draft a provision 
that requires companies to publish a data use policy that is easy for the 
average person to understand, as the Data Control Act does.182  Like the 
Data Control Act, this privacy policy requirement should also compel 
companies to explain the ways in which they will use consumer data.183  
Regulators, consumer advocates, and academics can hold companies 
accountable by analyzing companies’ detailed, but easy-to-follow 
privacy policies on behalf of consumers.184  Additionally, lawmakers 
should consider providing privacy protections for a broad range of 
consumer data while differentiating between sensitive data and non-
sensitive data.185   
Legislators should also avoid concentrating all enforcement 
powers in one agency and should instead consider distributing 
enforcement authority between the FTC, state AGs, and consumers 
through a private right of action.186  Overcentralization of power can 
overburden the enforcing agency and lead to limited enforcement activity 
by the agency.187  Based on its experience in the data privacy sphere, the 
FTC should be the main enforcement agency under any future federal 
 
 180. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (analyzing consumer rights that legislators 
should include in federal privacy proposals). 
 181. Id.; Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, Fed. Reg. at 
48601 (explaining the benefits of a flexible outcome-based approach to privacy regulation). 
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best practices for companies to draft privacy policies that are readable and understandable to 
consumers). 
 183. See Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. §3(A)(3)(B) (2019) (imposing privacy 
policy requirements for companies to implement). 
 184. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 78 (explaining the benefits of privacy policies 
to the public). 
 185. Id. (discussing the benefits of distinguishing between sensitive and non-sensitive 
information in context of providing privacy protections). 
 186. Supra Part V; see also Citron, supra note 23, at 798 (“State enforcers are essential to 
the efficient deterrence of privacy and data security violations given the increasing 
marginalization of private law and the practical constraints on federal agencies.”). 
 187. See Citron, supra note 23, at 799–800 (explaining the limits the FTC faces in its 
privacy enforcement activities). 
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privacy law.188  Nevertheless, state AGs should also have the power to 
bring enforcement actions on behalf of their residents to ensure robust 
enforcement.189  Finally, wronged consumers should be able to engage in 
external accountability through an appropriately limited private right of 
action that can prevent nuisance litigation.190  Ultimately, a 
comprehensive federal privacy law that establishes strong, uniform 
protections for data privacy will benefit industries like the financial 
services sector by providing certainty, maintaining consumer trust, and 
avoiding stifling industry innovation.191  
Although federal data privacy legislation will certainly ease the 
burden of compliance on financial institutions by bringing uniformity on 
a national level, this will not resolve all privacy issues.192  Because many 
financial services organizations must comply with the GDPR currently, a 
comprehensive federal data privacy law will create compliance 
challenges.193  With the addition of U.S. federal legislation, companies 
will have to navigate a new international patchwork of laws.194  
Uniformity of data privacy law at the national and international level 
would be ideal in light of the borderless nature of the Internet.195  
Nevertheless, U.S. lawmakers should begin by establishing a national 
standard that strikes a balance between protecting consumer data, 
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industry innovation, and the freedom of small businesses.196  This will 
mean selecting beneficial parts of the GDPR to incorporate into federal 
legislation, such as consumer rights to control their data, and discarding 
other parts, like the GDPR’s rigid fine structure.197  U.S. lawmakers 
should avoid overwhelming U.S. industries with  a burdensome data 




 196. See Schulze, supra note 193 (explaining GDPR consequences for U.S. companies). 
 197. See id. (addressing the compliance challenges associated with privacy law). 
 198. Id.; But see Tung, supra note 195 (evaluating the effects of the GDPR’s robust data 
privacy protections on the industry). 
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